| More articles on the Fatah -Hamas split |
The situation in Gaza is dire, and also confusing for many. JVP
has assembled this newsletter to help clear some of the fog surrounding
current events. Below, you will find an abridged version of a longer
article by JVP's Director of Education and Policy, Mitchell Plitnick
offering an analysis of the events in Gaza. We are also
recommending some articles for further reading, and we'll continue to
bring you these sorts of updates. This issue of our newsletter is
focused on Gaza, but we will bring the same quality analysis to you on
all the myriad issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict. Remember, almost all of our funding comes from
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Jewish Voice for Peace now. Gaza: Can Disaster Be Avoided? Mitchell Plitnick Click here for the full version of this article
Back in 2005, Jewish Voice for Peace took to the streets in San
Francisco to protest the just-commencing Israeli withdrawal from the
Gaza Strip. Of course, JVP was never opposed to Israel withdrawing its
soldiers and checkpoints and abandoning its settlements in Gaza. But
doing the right thing in the wrong way can be just as bad, in some ways
perhaps worse, than doing the wrong thing, and this was what we saw
happening with the Gaza withdrawal. Sadly, this prediction has come
true, now leaving the Palestinians split between two governing bodies,
leaving Gaza in ruin and chaos and leaving Israel with an increasingly
hostile and dangerous territory on its western border. The first thing
one sees when looking at the current split among the Palestinians is
that the situation is not one that can last. It's eminently clear that
the forces arrayed against Hamas-the US, Israel, Fatah, the moderate
Arab states, the EU-are not going to be content with the status quo.
Fatah in particular will not just sit idly by and let some 1.5 million
Palestinians be governed by someone else. They will have considerable
support from outside in pressing Hamas, politically, economically and
militarily. For its part, Hamas has already shown they can and will act
aggressively in pursuing their own position atop Palestinian society.
Right
now, reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas does not seem realistic and
there is no third option in the Palestinian polity. This would seem to
indicate that, at least for the time being, these two groups will
continue to work against one another and that the opportunity to engage
the broad spectrum of the Palestinian people by dealing with a
broad-based government with Abbas at its head is lost. Still, even
though the leaders of Fatah and Hamas have done little more than pay
lip service to the value of national unity among the Palestinians, this
value remains strong among the Palestinian populace. That might
pressure change and force the two groups together at some point. But
such a possibility is not on the radar right now.
On the other
hand, the view that seems to be dominating both Washington and
Jerusalem right now is quite distorted. It seems that the US and Israel
believe that they can crush Hamas for good by strengthening Abbas with
a peace summit and encouraging aggressive actions against Hamas in the
West Bank. The latter is a foolish strategy, and one that has
repeatedly bolstered Hamas, rather than weakened it. Indeed, virtually
every attempt by Israel, the US and much of the rest of the world to
harm Hamas has helped them over the years, and if foreign hands are
seen too clearly in Fatah's attacks on Hamas, support for Fatah, even
from within, will quickly wither.
Many analysts, including this
one, have been urging for some time that Hamas must be dealt with, not
shunned. By engaging Hamas and forcing them into politics rather than
ideological grandstanding, they will be forced to confront the
ineffectiveness of their more extreme positions, which is precisely
what happened after the election. This is why they were forced to allow
Abbas to represent the Palestinian government in the Arab League vote
on their peace proposal, and to allow him to keep his leading position
in any negotiations and contacts with Israel.
That Abbas will
not come back to Ramallah bearing an acceptable final status resolution
is inevitable. The only way he can do that is to offer at least the
hope that Israel can be convinced to return to something close to the
1967 borders, to share Jerusalem and to agree to acknowledge the
refugees' right of return, allow a token number back to Israel and
compensate the rest. Abbas need not actually deliver all of that. But
the whole idea of bolstering Abbas with a summit rests on the
presumption that a sufficient number of Palestinians can be convinced
that Abbas, freed of the burden of Hamas, can deliver the minimal
Palestinian demands some time in the near future. Abbas will need to
show some concrete indication that he can pull this off, and he will
have to do so with a very skeptical audience. The Olmert government is
far too weak to even signal the possibility of such concessions, much
less actually make them.
It is far from certain that Fatah would
win an all-out battle for the West Bank. But it is very likely that
Israel would be drawn into a conflict there, either to defend Fatah or
because some Palestinians decide to bring them in with an attack on
Israelis. The resulting violence would expand very quickly, and would
not only quickly bring back, and possibly surpass, the worst days of
the last intifada, but is likely to spark off conflicts in other areas
of the Middle East. There is very little good that can come of Fatah's
aggressive actions against Hamas in the West Bank, and the potential
for a great deal of harm.
And there are new concerns, ones which
Israel had better take very seriously. For quite some time now, we have
heard from Mahmoud Abbas as well as from Hamas leaders of attempts by
al-Qaeda and similar groups to gain a foothold within the Palestinian
Territories. Thus far, these have been rebuffed, and nothing in the
current developments will make either Fatah or Hamas more receptive to
such groups. But the general chaos in Gaza may well make it much more
difficult for the Palestinians to keep these groups out, and if Hamas
is proven to be a failure, the radical elements in Palestinian society
are going to turn not to more moderate elements, but to still more
radical ones, giving these groups a foothold. This would be exceedingly
dangerous for Israelis. Whatever one thinks of Hamas or Fatah, they are
not the same at all as al-Qaeda, simplistic Western propaganda
notwithstanding. The last thing any Israeli civilian wants is to see
al-Qaeda operating on their doorstep.
The simple fact is that
there can never be any progress between Israel and the Palestinians if
a big chunk of the Palestinian community, the Islamists, are excluded
from the process. Not only will many other Palestinians support their
right to be heard, but groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad can easily
derail any peace process with attacks on Israelis, as they have so
often done in the past. They need to be engaged so they will have
incentive to refrain from such actions. The alternative is not just
failure, it is a brand of radicalism that will be much worse.
Any
crisis contains in it the seeds of progress. These opportunities have
been routinely missed by all parties. This one has the potential for
serious consequences throughout the region, as well as the potential to
make any kind of peace unrealistic for years to come. That must not be
allowed to happen. Israel, the US, the PA, Hamas, the UN, the Arab
League, indeed, the entire world has got to allow good judgment and
cooler heads to prevail in this matter. If everyone continues to only
pursue their own political ends, disaster is sure to follow. But
history has witnessed occasions where people with understanding of
prevailing conditions and dynamics and sufficient diplomatic skill
overcome politics to bring about significant progress, and it is not
unusual for such things to happen just at the brink of disaster. Let's
hope that is the course that is chosen. In fact, let's demand it.
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