After Sharon - JVP In-Depth Analysis The surprising and sudden end to Ariel Sharon’s tenure as Prime Minister comes at a time when Israeli politics were already thrown into upheaval, by Sharon himself. After Amir Peretz won leadership of the Labor Party, marking some movement of that party toward the left, Sharon’s departure from Likud moved that party further to the right. Kadima, Sharon’s new party, could call itself centrist, as it lands between Labor and Likud, although a more objective view would call it moderately right-wing.
The Parties
There has been a constant stream of polls ever since Peretz’s victory and this has only increased since Sharon fell ill. Every one reflects the steady decline of Labor since the initial swell of victory in the wake of Peretz’s election. Still, the polls in the last few elections have not been terribly accurate, and the campaigns for the next government have been delayed by Sharon’s illness. So there remain many possibilities.
Kadima had grown much stronger in Sharon’s last days, and his illness has not stemmed that tide. In some ways, particularly as regards a challenge from Labor, Kadima is actually strengthened by Sharon’s incapacitation. Peretz, desiring to focus on domestic issues, would surely have attacked Sharon for his repeated corruption scandals, something that would certainly backfire now. Peretz was planning to make the souring Israeli economy his major focal point. But Ehud Olmert, who is now running at the head of Kadima, had little to do with economic decisions. It was Sharon and his Finance Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is leading Likud that did that, so the point is largely blunted.
But Kadima faces other challenges. While both the party and the populace are rallying around Olmert in the name of Sharon, this can only take Olmert so far. He will need to establish himself as a leader in whom people have confidence. This will not be easy for him. He was a controversial figure during his days as mayor of Jerusalem, and not seen as a particularly clever or charismatic man. He does not have followers in politics the way Sharon did. He will soon need to assemble the list of candidates for the Knesset from Kadima. This is generally a very contentious time, with various individuals vying for higher spots on the slate. Olmert will have a very difficult time managing this. Olmert’s task is further complicated by two other factors. One is that virtually everyone believes that Kadima will slip in the polls before Election Day, because at least some of their current strength is based on sympathy for Sharon. While it still appears nearly certain that Kadima will win the most seats, it seems unlikely they will sustain the 42 or so seats most polls give them now. As people get used to life after Sharon, his absence will no longer buoy Kadima’s chances, but will hurt them.
The second factor is the very nature of the party. Kadima was essentially set up to the party of Ariel Sharon. On some level, at least, it is a cult of personality. While this aspect should not be overestimated, it still means something. The platform on which Kadima stands is the Sharon platform, and Sharon is gone. While the platform may have brought both voters and politicians in from both Labor and Likud, Sharon’s proven ability to execute those plans was also a major factor. Olmert will face a heavy task indeed in trying to keep the disparate personalities who populate Kadima on the same page.
Likud has rebounded somewhat from the devastating loss of Sharon. With him went most of the more moderate Likudniks. While the party did not tilt all the way to the right end of Israeli politics (they repudiated the candidacy of Moshe Feiglein, who is about as far to the right as anyone in Israeli politics), the leadership of Netanyahu and the departure of most of their more moderate members puts them outside the Israeli mainstream. Netanyahu has managed to stabilize matters and Likud has gained back a few Knesset seats in the polls. But they are still running a solid third behind Labor and Kadima. Likud’s most realistic ambition is to overtake Labor and come in second. Thus far, Amir Peretz’s leadership of Labor has been disappointing, to say the least. Failing to keep the more centrist, old-guard faces like Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak in the party is not necessarily the wrong route for Peretz; but it does necessitate reaching out to new constituencies, such as left-wing voters and Arabs, which Peretz has not yet done. The weak campaign slogan – “Because the time has come” – and the rumored “peace plan” that really differs from Kadima only in its absurdity are signs of poor political strategy and leadership from Peretz. It is early in the game, and Peretz may have a quick enough learning curve to turn things around. But he will need to do so quickly, if Labor is even to position itself as a serious opposition party and potential contender in the next elections.
As to the smaller parties…The left-wing Meretz-Yachad is looking at somewhere between 6 and 10 seats, and is almost certain to be outside the next government and a marginal player in the Knesset at best. The Arab parties will remain marginal. Shinui, which once cast itself in the role of a “centrist party” in Israel has lost much of its impetus and is unlikely to fare any better than Meretz, and quite possibly considerably worse, as many of its voters will likely go over to Kadima. The most significant gains may be seen by religious parties, particularly Shas. While most polls show Shas either holding steady at 11 seats or gaining just a few, the party is likely to be key to forming the next coalition government. The need for coalition is quite likely to strengthen the power of religious parties in Israel.
Prospects for peace
The real question concerning most of us is what all of this means for the future of the Israel-Palestine conflict. In the short term, it probably means very little. In the March election, a Kadima victory is the overwhelming likelihood, and Kadima will be bound to “Ariel Sharon’s vision.” The main aspects of Sharon’s plan for the Occupied Territories – the continuing construction of the separation wall and unilateral disengagement – enjoy great popularity in Israel and are likely to continue in some fashion. However, it is uncertain whether Ehud Olmert, or any other potential leader will have the ability and political clout to evacuate any more settlements.
The next government will also have to deal with a Palestinian Authority that is falling apart and will have significant representation from Hamas within it. Sharon stated repeatedly that he would not deal with Hamas in the PA. Perhaps this was bluster and he might have relented if given no option (and if the Americans insisted), but it will now be even more difficult for an Israeli leader to veer away from this dangerous course.
With the ruling Fatah party in the PA facing virtual disintegration, there is a real possibility for a renewed period of intense violence. The second intifada was as much a response to the PA’s incompetence, autocratic style and corruption as it was to the Israeli occupation. In Gaza, intra-communal violence is rising sharply, and, as one observer put it, when such violence rises, Israel usually gets brought into it. Moreover, with the election coming, “get-tough” rhetoric, as well as possible actions from the current Israeli government trying to stay in power is likely to rise. This will couple with the end of the cease-fire that held for much of 2005. As the wall continues to grow, the situation in Gaza continues to worsen and Israel continues to build and expand settlements in the West Bank, the powder keg that is always there is becoming more and more unstable.
Israel is simply going to have to deal with Hamas in some fashion, whether it wants to or not. But doing so will not be an easy sell to the Israeli people. It will be harder for Olmert than Peretz, though, leaving yet another avenue that Peretz could exploit if he ever gets serious about his campaign. In the longer term, there remains some hope. If Amir Peretz can get serious and get back to the sort of rhetoric he was espousing during his campaign for the Labor leadership, this might help bring Israeli public opinion back toward a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. And, while both the United States and Israel continue to pin their hopes on the corrupted and increasingly disgraced Fatah “old guard”, the many leading figures in Fatah who have been serious about reform offer the real possibility of a stable Palestinian leadership that has the backing of its people for the first time in years. There is the possibility that these two factors may come together at the same time as a new administration takes over in Washington, one where the neoconservatives and oil hawks have far less influence over Middle East policy. Should that occur, there could well be a real opening for more reasonable heads to start prevailing, at least a little, through the ongoing madness.
Iran
Finally, there is the ongoing question of Iran. In recent days, Israel has been giving indications that it is not anxious to proceed with an attack on Iran at this time, but this could just as easily be diplomatic double-talk as it could be sincere. On the one hand, it would certainly boost the existing government’s stature if Israel launched a successful attack on an Iranian nuclear facility without any damaging reprisals. But that is not a sure bet. The attack could fail, or Iran could respond in a manner that further enflames the already blazing region and puts Israel in the middle of another war.
Much will depend on pressure from America. The Bush Administration has already armed Israel with the bunker-busting bombs it would need to strike at an underground nuclear facility. More than likely, it will be in Washington’s hands as to whether an Israeli attack goes forward or not. There couldn’t be a better time to begin calling for diplomacy over violence when it comes to Iran. © Copyright by JewishVoiceForPeace.org |
