Sharon and Disengagement

The tougher sell for Sharon was the plan for “unilateral disengagement.” In particular, it was difficult because that had been part of the platform held by his opponent in the last election, Amram Mitzna of Labor. For Sharon’s right-wing supporters, the results of that election meant that the Israeli public rejected that idea. But Sharon recognized that this was not the case, and began planning for a complete evacuation of Israeli settlements, military bases and all Israeli personnel from the Gaza Strip.

As far as the Palestinians, Sharon well understood that Gaza was not only horribly devastated during the intifada, but even before that was one of the most overcrowded and economically depressed places in the world. By refusing to work with the Palestinian Authority to coordinate the withdrawal, he undermined and humiliated Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The PA was already very weak in Gaza, and there was no possibility of any other group being able to control Gaza effectively. Sharon could feel quite confident that Gaza would encounter the serious problems that have accompanied de-colonization throughout the world.

More than this, Gaza is surrounded by its own separation wall, although in contrast to the barrier being built in the West Bank, few are aware of this fact outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Thus, Israel was able to mount surveillance equipment and remote-controlled weapons all around Gaza as well as completely restrict Palestinian movement in and out of Gaza. Only a rare show of strong intervention by the US even allowed for Palestinians to move in and out of Gaza at the south border with Egypt. Israel also maintained control over Gaza’s water and electricity supplies. All this, and Israel was able to declare their occupation of Gaza over, and all their responsibility for Gaza discharged.

 

Images like these were played to the hilt by

Sharon during the Withdrawal

Domestically, the disengagement meant the end of Sharon’s days in the Likud coalition. Much of the Likud, and certainly the smaller parties to the right of Likud, were furious at what they saw as Sharon’s betrayal and capitulation. Sharon well knew that this would happen. He eventually decided that, despite the fact that he probably could have held on to the Likud leadership, he preferred having a party behind him that he would not have constant battles with. Thus was born Kadima, Sharon’s new, “centrist” party.

Kadima’s being called centrist is more reflective of the Israeli political map than it is of any sort of moderate attitudes in the party. With Sharon’s departure, most in the Likud who sided with him went with him, leaving Likud in the hands of radical right-wingers. Much of the “old guard” of the Labor Party also gravitated toward Kadima. With the ascent of Amir Peretz, a lifelong trade unionist, to the top of Labor, the party was more in touch with its socialistic roots than it had been for many decades. But in terms of Israel’s relationship to the Palestinians and the Arab world, Labor is not particularly “left”, with Peretz vowing to hold on to all of Jerusalem and coming up with a 100-year lease plan for the Jordan Valley.

Disengagement’s biggest prize for Sharon was the way it was received in the United States. On October 8, 2004 in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, a top aide to Sharon explained that the purpose of the Gaza withdrawal was to “pour formaldehyde into the peace process.” It worked like a charm. Aided by a media that simply ate up images of young Jewish girls and orthodox Jews wailing as they were taken from buildings in Gaza, Israel and Sharon were seen as making “painful compromises” and the ball was now effectively in the Palestinians’ court.

In reality, the Gaza withdrawal passed rather quietly. Much like the evacuation of Sinai two decades earlier, Sharon did all he could to hype the difficulty of the withdrawal. But in the end, there were no settlers and soldiers shooting at each other, no massive conflagrations, no civil war. What it actually demonstrated was how easily a settlement could be evacuated. But this was not the way it was portrayed, either for Israelis or Americans.