Sharon’s setback, 1983-1996

With the release of the Kahan Commission report, Sharon was relieved of his position as Defense Minister. His position in some sectors of the popular Israeli mind as well as in the Likud Coalition, however, enabled him to remain in the cabinet as a minister without portfolio. Still, while this might seem a tragically light punishment for so awesome a crime, Sharon felt it a major setback. Much of the Israeli mainstream viewed him with disdain over his actions in Lebanon. Ironically, it was Sharon’s excesses in Lebanon that helped to spawn and spur the peace movement in Israel.

Ariel Sharon was not particularly good at taking orders and was far more comfortable designing policy than he was carrying out policy designed by others. His frequent tendency to stretch or even disobey orders is testament to this. Sharon quit the military when he believed he might not ever attain the position of Chief of Staff. His ambition in politics was to become Prime Minister.

After Lebanon, however, the chances of his ever attaining that position seemed nil. It was not only Sabra and Shatilla, but the larger quagmire of the Lebanon invasion itself. What was to be a limited operation became, thanks largely to Sharon, a prolonged war, often referred to as “Israel’s Vietnam.” The motives for the war were not clear to much of the public, or to the soldiers who had to fight it once the PLO had been expelled from Lebanon. For the first time, conscientious objection had become a notable public phenomenon in Israel. The bloody nature of the invasion and the high number of civilian casualties in Lebanon angered many Israelis. The fact that it took only the murder of one man in Lebanon to unravel Sharon’s plan for control of that country also made some of those who were less concerned over the loss of life question Sharon’s judgment. Finally, the Lebanon invasion seriously damaged Israel’s image in the international community. It was seen by most of the world, and even by some in America, as a war of aggression carried out in a brutal fashion. Much of the good will Israel had gained by entering a peace treaty with Egypt (which even had gotten some good reviews in parts of the Arab world) was squandered. And for nearly 18 years, Israeli soldiers would continue to kill and die in Lebanon, until finally enough Israelis would stand up and say no more.

But Sharon was nothing if not determined. He remained a key figure in the Likud, presenting challenges first to Yitzhak Shamir and later to Benjamin Netanyahu for leadership of the coalition, and maintaining a position in government for most of this time. Over the course of successive governments headed by both Labor and Likud, Sharon was first Minister of Trade and Development and then Minister of Housing and Construction. Finally, in 1992, Labor won the election outright for the first time since the 1970s (previous Labor leadership under Shimon Peres had been part of a government of national unity) and Sharon had to shout his opposition to the Madrid peace process, which was soon to spawn the Oslo Accords, from the seat of a member of the Knesset, rather than from some Ministerial position.

All through these years, Sharon continued to work to expand the settlements, meeting with ever-increasing success. He also worked at every turn to undermine the secular nationalism of the PLO, which in turn helped promote the rise of radical Islamic groups, most notably Hamas. Despite being farther from the seat of power he most desired, Sharon continued to entrench Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Even outside of the government, it was Sharon’s voice that was the loudest in opposing the Oslo Accords. Sharon worked diligently through the media, calling for Jews to come and settle in the West Bank; and through his network of funders, finding new and creative ways to funnel more than enough money into the settlement project to keep it going strong. Before leaving the cabinet, and continuing through the next several years, Sharon spearheaded the drive to bring as many Jews as possible from the disintegrating Soviet Union and plant as many of them as possible in the settlements as well.

Still, it seemed that Lebanon and his long history of alienating powerful people in Israeli politics would forever prevent Sharon from attaining a senior post in government, let alone being a serious candidate for Prime Minister.