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Abbas Calls for End of Armed Struggle and an Analysis of Israel-South Africa Analogy


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December 15, 2004

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Today's Contents:

Abbas: Armed struggle a mistake, harms Palestinians (Ha'aretz) Statement comes on the heels of trips to Egypt and Syria

Is it Apartheid? (Direct E-Mail) Moshe Machover analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of comparing Israel to Apartheid South Africa

 

[JPN Commentary: With the confidence born of his perceived certainty of winning the upcoming election for Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has renewed his call for ending the armed aspect of the intifada.

It would be hard to argue with the basic call being issued. On a moral level, non-violence as a desirable option is axiomatic. Too much of the violence from both sides has been directed at civilians, and, to the extent that non-civilians are targeted, the Palestinians simply cannot compete with Israel in their ability to use force. While neither side has been able to prevail through the use of violence, it is hard to see any gains for the Palestinians through the use of violence.

Abbas issued a similar call during his short tenure as Palestinian Prime Minister, and the response of the Palestinian public was not favorable. Now, Palestinian public opinion seems to have shifted away from armed struggle. Still, unity among Palestinians is strongly valued. Should the armed groups choose not cooperate with Abbas' vision and should he then respond aggressively against them, he may well find his popularity taking a nosedive. This would not be due to support for the armed groups so much as the overriding value of unity among the Palestinian populace, a value that is quite strong despite the reality that Palestinian politics remains very fractious, with rivalries occasionally stepping over the line into violence.

Abbas' statement is part of a larger strategy. While he is already assured that the US and Israel support him, he has been working feverishly to strengthen relationships with Egypt and Syria as well. Egypt has already renewed some of its economic ties with Israel and there has been a definite warming of relations there. Syria, which is certainly feeling nervous about American threats, has again issued a call for peace talks with Israel, and Israel has again ignored this. Abbas is trying to present himself as a person who can bridge gaps and be a conduit for the various sides.

The risk, however, is found among the Palestinians. Many are very skeptical about Abbas and his commitment to core Palestinian goals: a state along the lines of the 1967 border, a capital in East Jerusalem, including Palestinian control of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and recognition of the refugees' rights. Hamas, which has already rejected Abbas' call, has tepidly supported Abbas and seems to be taking a wait and see attitude toward the "new" Palestinian Authority. Abbas' trip to Syria also included meeting with Khaled Meshal, one of Hamas' key political leaders, and the recent target of an Israeli assassination attempt.

Whether or not Abbas will be able to walk this tightrope remains to be seen. He would do well, however to learn from the history of his predecessor. Arafat too tried to be the man to control the Palestinian use of arms, while Israel gave little or nothing in return and was supported in this by the American view that Israel, not the Palestinians, were making the "brave compromises". Early indications are that Abbas is heading down the same road. – MP]

Abbas: Armed struggle a mistake, harms Palestinians

By Arnon Regular

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/514516.html


The use of weapons in the four-year-long intifada was a mistake and should end, Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Mahmoud Abbas said yesterday in an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat.

Abbas, who is expected to win the January 9 presidential elections in the Palestinian Authority, said Palestinians should resist the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza without resorting to violence.

It is important to "keep the uprising away from arms because the uprising is a legitimate right of the people to express their rejection of the occupation by popular and social means," he said. "Using the weapons was harmful and has got to stop."

In response, the White House said it welcomed moves aimed at fighting terror. "We remain focused on working toward a strategy that will put in place the institutions necessary for a viable [Palestinians] state to emerge," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said. "But fighting terrorism and putting in a unified security force are key to those efforts."

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's office refused to comment on the interview, sticking to its policy of avoiding any show of support for Abbas lest it sour the support for him in the Palestinian street.

The idea of giving up weapons was dismissed by a spokesman for Hamas, however. Khaled Meshal, head of the Hamas politburo based in Damascus, said Hamas is not yet ready to accept a cease-fire with Israel. However, Meshal did say that a pan-Palestinian agreement for a cease-fire remains an option.

Palestinian sources meanwhile were saying that while Abbas was cordial in his meetings with Meshal and Islamic Jihad figures in Damascus, the meeting was brief, and Abbas intends to focus on Hamas and other factions in the territories and will give short shrift to the Syrian-based Hamas activists.

A pragmatic businessman who was long at Yasser Arafat's side as the No. 2 in the PLO, Abbas has been opposed to the armed intifada since it began in September 2000. While Arafat was still alive, Abbas told associates in closed-door meetings that he felt the uprising was a mistake, but only hinted at it in public, not wanting to challenge Arafat.

However, during a brief period as Palestinian Authority prime minister in 2003, he tried to push his plan to disarm the irregulars and tried to get Arafat to hand over the authority over the PA security forces, which Abbas planned to unify into three groups. Since assuming the PLO's leadership, he has been speaking about that plan again - this time without Arafat to obstruct it.

Earlier this week, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that if the Palestinians work to quell the violence, Israel could coordinate its planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four West Banks settlements with the new Palestinian leadership, and that Israel would be ready to hand over West Bank cities now under Israeli control to the PA if it could guarantee law and order would prevail.

Abbas told the newspaper that Palestinian security is currently in a state of chaos. "Frankly, the Palestinian [security] apparatus needs discipline. There is security chaos; that's why were demanding and are seeking to unify the security apparatus," Abbas told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he was in talks with the militant Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to bring them into the framework of the PLO.


[JPN Commentary: Is Israel on its way to becoming an apartheid state?  Is it an apartheid state already?   The "Separation" Wall that is now being built inside the West Bank is often called "the Apartheid Wall."  The three isolated enclaves in the West Bank that might or might not be the future Palestinian state are often described as "Bantustans."   And in a recent article ("Sharon and the Future of Palestine," NY Review of Books, 12/2/04, posted on JPN on 12/6/04) Henry Siegman quotes Nahum Barnea, Israel's most respected political commentator:   "[Israel] is not yet the South Africa of apartheid, but is definitely from the same family."

In his article "Is it Apartheid?" Moshe Machover, a co-founder of Matzpen, the Israeli Socialist Organization and currently a professor of philosophy in London, points out some significant differences between the policy of the Israeli government and the apartheid model.  According to Machover, drawing a close analogy between Israel and South Africa is not only a theoretical mistake, but - for progressives like JPN readers - a political mistake as well.

No doubt, the two models have quite a bit in common: racism, separation among ethnic groups and exploitation of coveted resources.  But the decisive difference between the two, says Machover, is the intended fate of the dispossessed natives.  In the apartheid model, labor power is the main exploited resource.  In other models (for example, in the United States colonization of the western frontier, or during the 1948 war in Israel/Palestine) the native population is exterminated or expelled, rather than exploited.  As Machover points out, both the Labor and the Likud parties in Israel always wished to "transfer" as many Palestinians as possible.  The only difference between the two was (and continues to be) the perception of realistic methods by which "transfer" can be achieved.

Of course, history does not move in a straight line.  As the Israeli political economist (now at York University) Jonathan Nitzan pointed out (private correspondence),  during the 70's and 80's the occupied Palestinians were integrated into the Israeli economy both as forced consumers of Israeli goods and services, and as a source of cheap labor which, among other things, was used to undermine the organized power of Jewish labor.    A combination of such factors was probably among the reasons for the Oslo agreement. As the Israeli linguist and peace activist Tanya Reinhart pointed out during the Oslo euphoria, the best the Palestinians could hope to get from the Oslo accord was a move toward a purer apartheid model.

All this has changed, of course (as Nitzan observes).  The end of the Arab boycott made the Palestinian market irrelevant, and a wave of foreign workers entering Israel made most Palestinian workers redundant.  In other words,   Palestinians have been disposable once again, and the apartheid model is not a desirable option any longer.  Bantustans is not what Sharon is after.  Rather, his ideal is the smallest possible Palestinian reservations.  This is why, according to Machover, talk of "Israeli apartheid" serves to divert attention from much greater dangers.  After all, apartheid is reversible.  It is not clear that ethnic cleansing can be.

A personal note:  fresh out of my kibbutz high school but before my draft (and before the '67 war) I was given a book in Hebrew named _Peace, Peace and There is No Peace_.  This book taught me a great deal about Israeli politics and the role of states in modern society.  Thirty eight years later, it's a pleasure to introduce JPN readers to one of the two authors of this book.  -- AK]

Is it Apartheid?

by Moshe Machover

10 November 2004

In recent months there is a growing tendency among opponents of Israeli oppression and defenders of Palestinian rights to refer to Israeli policy towards the Palestinians as "apartheid".

The "separation wall" that Israel is constructing on Palestinian lands is often denounced as the "apartheid wall". An International conference on Palestine scheduled for 5 December 2004 at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London is entitled by its organizers as "Resisting Israeli Apartheid: Strategies and Principles".

I would like to warn against an unthinking use of this misleading analogy between Israeli policy and that of the defunct apartheid regime in South Africa. It is theoretically false and politically harmful.

To be sure, the two have many features in common. Both are perniciously racist; both impose a degree of separation between ethnic groups. And this is no accident: both are instances of the genus colonial settler state. Indeed, Israel and apartheid South Africa were, until the latter's demise, the last two surviving active instances of this genus.[1] Now Israel is the only remaining one.

But the point is that they belong to two distinct species of the genus. All colonial settlers' societies built themselves up on exploiting the resources of the country that they colonized: primarily its land, which they wrested from the indigenous people, who became dispossessed. The decisive difference between the two species was what was to become of the dispossessed natives.

In one model of colonization, their labor power became one of the indigenous resources - indeed, the main resource - to be exploited by the settlers. The ethnic conflict between the two groups thus assumed the nature of a kind of class struggle. This model is represented, in almost pure form, by apartheid South Africa.

In the other model, the native population was to be eliminated; exterminated or expelled rather than exploited. Israel is an active instance of this model. If you wish to find an instructive parallel, look not at South Africa. Rather, read Dee Brown's Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West.

Apartheid was a device for keeping the exploited natives - the majority of the population - as part of the same economy, and therefore essentially also of the same society, as the settler exploiters; but without actually admitting it, and without giving the former rights of citizenship. Officially, the natives were citizens of fake states, the Bantustans. But the last thing the architects of the apartheid state wanted was a real departure of the black Africans, whose labor power was vital for its economy.

Zionism never intended to create a Palestinostan for the Palestinian Arabs. From the very start, it planned to get rid of them, to create a purely Jewish "Land of Israel". This premeditated policy - referred to in Zionist literature as 'transfer' - was largely implemented in the 1948 war. The Palestinian Arab minority whom - for lack of time or opportunity – the nascent Israeli state failed to expel from its territory did not seem to represent a major "demographic threat". To be sure, their lands were for the most part expropriated and given over to Jewish settlements, they were severely discriminated and for many years kept under military rule. But, crucially, they were not denied rudimentary citizenship rights. They are Israeli citizens, who can vote for the Knesset.

A new problem arose following the June 1967 war. Israel found itself controlling the whole of Palestine as well as a part of Syria. But, from the Zionists' viewpoint, this great territorial acquisition of their wet dreams came with an encumbrance: a large Arab population, many of them refugees of the 1948 ethnic cleansing and their descendants. This population, which "remained 'stuck' to their places," the Zionists realized, "may destroy the very foundation of our state."[2] Israel managed to ethnically cleanse some

of the newly occupied territories, such as the whole of the Golan Heights, the Latroun salient in the approaches to Jerusalem, and some refugee camps near Jericho. But the bulk of the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip still "remained stuck to their places."

Zionists of all major parties - Labor and Likud alike - ardently wished to 'transfer' as many Palestinians as possible. The only difference was about what was considered possible. The more pragmatic or cautious among them thought that the 'world' (which for Israel meant primarily US politicians and opinion-manufacturers) would not allow a massive ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, it was becoming clear, especially during the first Intifada, that Israel could not afford to control the Palestinian population directly.

These more pragmatic Zionists looked for a Palestinian leadership to do the job for them: to control and repress the Palestinians, thus guaranteeing the security of Israel. This was the essence of the Oslo Accord, which Peres managed to sell to Rabin and, no less important, to Yasser Arafat.[3]

The Oslo plan, had it materialized, would indeed have led to something like a Palestinian Bantustan, resulting in a convergence of the Zionist settler state towards the apartheid model. But this was not to be. The plan was vigorously opposed by more optimistic or fundamentalist Zionists, such as Ehud Barak in the Labor Party and most of the leaders of Likud. Just in time, Rabin was assassinated. The Netanyahu government which followed stalled the implementation of Israel's side of the Oslo bargain, thus subverting it. The next Israeli prime minister, Labor's Ehud Barak, continued this policy at Camp David by a more subtle means: dictating to Arafat new conditions, falsely packaged as a 'generous offer', that even he could not accept.

The next prime minister, Ariel 'Bulldozer' Sharon, true to his legendary brutality and blood lust, has pursued yet another tactic: smashing the Palestinian Authority's resources and at the same time deliberately provoking Palestinian suicide bombings, so as to expose Arafat's inability to serve as Israel's security guard, and thus prove his uselessness and irrelevance from a Zionist viewpoint.

What Sharon & Co are planning is not really an apartheid regime. They are not interested in keeping the Palestinians permanently in place, as a subjugated population. They are planning to ethnically cleanse as many Palestinians as possible. Of course, this requires what in Zionist parlance is referred to as she'at kosher, an opportune moment. A general upheaval in the Middle East may present a suitable opportunity. If necessary, it could actually be provoked. Meantime, as a purely temporary measure, the Palestinian population is to be atomized and separated - not only from the Israeli Jews but also within their own community, village from village, neighborhood from neighborhood. And make no mistake: this is not going to be like a Bantustan, more like a series of Indian Reservations.

Conflating this with apartheid in fact misses the most essential point. Incidentally, it can also backfire: defenders of Zionism can easily show that the Palestinian citizens of Israel, while not enjoying equal rights, are nevertheless considerably better off than Black Africans used to be under apartheid.

But, much more importantly: talk of Israeli 'apartheid' serves to divert attention from much greater dangers. For, as far as most Palestinians are concerned, the Zionist policy is far worse than apartheid. Apartheid can be reversed. Ethnic cleansing is immeasurably harder to reverse; at least not in the short or medium term.

To be sure: there is one great difference between the Zionist colonization project and that of the United States. When the US achieved its 'manifest destiny' and reached from ocean to ocean, grinding to dust the indigenous people - that was that: no more 'Red Indians' to hunt and uproot. In the case of Zionist Israel, no matter how far it can expand - and surely it will need to expand further in order to protect and defend its former expansion - it will always be confronted and surrounded by Arabs. If the Arab world will one day unite, it can defeat and reverse Zionist expansionism.

But this will require a far-reaching transformation of the Arab World, defeat of its present ruling classes and unification of the Arab nation.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. There are of course several other states that started off in this way; but they have ceased to be active in a sense similar to that in which an extinct volcano still exists as a mountain, but is no longer active as a volcano.

2. Joseph Weitz, 'A solution to the refugee problem: a State of Israel with a small Arab minority', Davar, 29 September 1967. Davar was the Histadrut daily, in effect organ of the Israeli Labor Party. Weitz was member of that party, an apparatchik who had played a central role in planning the transfer before 1948 and implementing it during 1948/49.

3. I have dealt elsewhere with the reasons for Arafat's acquiescence in accepting what amounted to little more than the job of Israel's proxy Palestinian Police Chief.

 


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