Abbas: Armed struggle a mistake, harms
Palestinians (Ha'aretz) Statement comes
on the heels of trips to Egypt and Syria
Is it
Apartheid? (Direct E-Mail) Moshe Machover analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of comparing Israel to Apartheid South
Africa
[JPN Commentary: With the confidence born
of his perceived certainty of winning the upcoming election for Palestinian
president, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) has renewed his call for ending the armed
aspect of the intifada.
It would be hard to argue with the basic call being issued. On a moral
level, non-violence as a desirable option is axiomatic. Too much of the violence
from both sides has been directed at civilians, and, to the extent that
non-civilians are targeted, the Palestinians simply cannot compete with Israel
in their ability to use force. While neither side has been able to prevail
through the use of violence, it is hard to see any gains for the Palestinians
through the use of violence.
Abbas issued a similar call during his short tenure as Palestinian Prime
Minister, and the response of the Palestinian public was not favorable. Now,
Palestinian public opinion seems to have shifted away from armed struggle.
Still, unity among Palestinians is strongly valued. Should the armed groups
choose not cooperate with Abbas' vision and should he then respond aggressively
against them, he may well find his popularity taking a nosedive. This would not
be due to support for the armed groups so much as the overriding value of unity
among the Palestinian populace, a value that is quite strong despite the reality
that Palestinian politics remains very fractious, with rivalries occasionally
stepping over the line into violence.
Abbas' statement is part of a larger strategy. While he is already
assured that the US and Israel support him, he has been working feverishly to
strengthen relationships with Egypt and Syria as well. Egypt has already renewed
some of its economic ties with Israel and there has been a definite warming of
relations there. Syria, which is certainly feeling nervous about American
threats, has again issued a call for peace talks with Israel, and Israel has
again ignored this. Abbas is trying to present himself as a person who can
bridge gaps and be a conduit for the various sides.
The risk, however, is found among the Palestinians. Many are very
skeptical about Abbas and his commitment to core Palestinian goals: a state
along the lines of the 1967 border, a capital in East Jerusalem, including
Palestinian control of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, and recognition of the
refugees' rights. Hamas, which has already rejected Abbas' call, has tepidly
supported Abbas and seems to be taking a wait and see attitude toward the "new"
Palestinian Authority. Abbas' trip to Syria also included meeting with Khaled
Meshal, one of Hamas' key political leaders, and the recent target of an Israeli
assassination attempt.
Whether or not Abbas will be able to walk this tightrope remains to be
seen. He would do well, however to learn from the history of his predecessor.
Arafat too tried to be the man to control the Palestinian use of arms, while
Israel gave little or nothing in return and was supported in this by the
American view that Israel, not the Palestinians, were making the "brave
compromises". Early indications are that Abbas is heading down the same road. –
MP]
Abbas: Armed struggle a mistake, harms
Palestinians
By Arnon Regular
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/514516.html
The use of weapons in the four-year-long intifada was a mistake and
should end, Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Mahmoud Abbas said
yesterday in an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq
Al-Awsat.
Abbas, who is expected to win the January 9 presidential
elections in the Palestinian Authority, said Palestinians should resist the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza without resorting to
violence.
It is important to "keep the uprising away from arms because
the uprising is a legitimate right of the people to express their rejection of
the occupation by popular and social means," he said. "Using the weapons was
harmful and has got to stop."
In response, the White House said it
welcomed moves aimed at fighting terror. "We remain focused on working toward a
strategy that will put in place the institutions necessary for a viable
[Palestinians] state to emerge," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said.
"But fighting terrorism and putting in a unified security force are key to those
efforts."
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's office refused to comment on the
interview, sticking to its policy of avoiding any show of support for Abbas lest
it sour the support for him in the Palestinian street.
The idea of giving
up weapons was dismissed by a spokesman for Hamas, however. Khaled Meshal, head
of the Hamas politburo based in Damascus, said Hamas is not yet ready to accept
a cease-fire with Israel. However, Meshal did say that a pan-Palestinian
agreement for a cease-fire remains an option.
Palestinian sources
meanwhile were saying that while Abbas was cordial in his meetings with Meshal
and Islamic Jihad figures in Damascus, the meeting was brief, and Abbas intends
to focus on Hamas and other factions in the territories and will give short
shrift to the Syrian-based Hamas activists.
A pragmatic businessman who
was long at Yasser Arafat's side as the No. 2 in the PLO, Abbas has been opposed
to the armed intifada since it began in September 2000. While Arafat was still
alive, Abbas told associates in closed-door meetings that he felt the uprising
was a mistake, but only hinted at it in public, not wanting to challenge
Arafat.
However, during a brief period as Palestinian Authority prime
minister in 2003, he tried to push his plan to disarm the irregulars and tried
to get Arafat to hand over the authority over the PA security forces, which
Abbas planned to unify into three groups. Since assuming the PLO's leadership,
he has been speaking about that plan again - this time without Arafat to
obstruct it.
Earlier this week, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that if
the Palestinians work to quell the violence, Israel could coordinate its planned
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four West Banks settlements with the new
Palestinian leadership, and that Israel would be ready to hand over West Bank
cities now under Israeli control to the PA if it could guarantee law and order
would prevail.
Abbas told the newspaper that Palestinian security is
currently in a state of chaos. "Frankly, the Palestinian [security] apparatus
needs discipline. There is security chaos; that's why were demanding and are
seeking to unify the security apparatus," Abbas told Asharq Al-Awsat. He said he
was in talks with the militant Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, to bring
them into the framework of the PLO.
[JPN Commentary: Is Israel on its way to becoming an
apartheid state? Is it an apartheid state already? The "Separation" Wall that
is now being built inside the West Bank is often called "the Apartheid Wall."
The three isolated enclaves in the West Bank that might or might not be the
future Palestinian state are often described as "Bantustans." And in a recent
article ("Sharon and the Future of Palestine," NY Review of Books, 12/2/04,
posted on JPN on 12/6/04) Henry Siegman quotes Nahum Barnea, Israel's most
respected political commentator: "[Israel] is not yet the South Africa of
apartheid, but is definitely from the same family."
In his article "Is it Apartheid?" Moshe Machover, a co-founder of
Matzpen, the Israeli Socialist Organization and currently a professor of
philosophy in London, points out some significant differences between the policy
of the Israeli government and the apartheid model. According to Machover,
drawing a close analogy between Israel and South Africa is not only a
theoretical mistake, but - for progressives like JPN readers - a political
mistake as well.
No doubt, the two models have quite a bit in common: racism, separation
among ethnic groups and exploitation of coveted resources. But the decisive
difference between the two, says Machover, is the intended fate of the
dispossessed natives. In the apartheid model, labor power is the main exploited
resource. In other models (for example, in the United States colonization of
the western frontier, or during the 1948 war in Israel/Palestine) the native
population is exterminated or expelled, rather than exploited. As Machover
points out, both the Labor and the Likud parties in Israel always wished to
"transfer" as many Palestinians as possible. The only difference between the
two was (and continues to be) the perception of realistic methods by which
"transfer" can be achieved.
Of course, history does not move in a straight line. As the Israeli
political economist (now at York University) Jonathan Nitzan pointed out
(private correspondence), during the 70's and 80's the occupied Palestinians
were integrated into the Israeli economy both as forced consumers of Israeli
goods and services, and as a source of cheap labor which, among other things,
was used to undermine the organized power of Jewish labor. A combination of
such factors was probably among the reasons for the Oslo agreement. As the
Israeli linguist and peace activist Tanya Reinhart pointed out during the Oslo
euphoria, the best the Palestinians could hope to get from the Oslo accord was a
move toward a purer apartheid model.
All this has changed, of course (as Nitzan observes). The end of the
Arab boycott made the Palestinian market irrelevant, and a wave of foreign
workers entering Israel made most Palestinian workers redundant. In other
words, Palestinians have been disposable once again, and the apartheid model
is not a desirable option any longer. Bantustans is not what Sharon is after.
Rather, his ideal is the smallest possible Palestinian reservations. This is
why, according to Machover, talk of "Israeli apartheid" serves to divert
attention from much greater dangers. After all, apartheid is reversible. It is
not clear that ethnic cleansing can be.
A personal note: fresh out of my kibbutz high school but before my draft
(and before the '67 war) I was given a book in Hebrew named _Peace, Peace and
There is No Peace_. This book taught me a great deal about Israeli politics and
the role of states in modern society. Thirty eight years later, it's a pleasure
to introduce JPN readers to one of the two authors of this book. -- AK]
Is it Apartheid?
by Moshe Machover
10 November 2004
In recent months there is a growing tendency among opponents of Israeli
oppression and defenders of Palestinian rights to refer to Israeli policy
towards the Palestinians as "apartheid".
The "separation wall" that Israel is constructing on Palestinian lands is
often denounced as the "apartheid wall". An International conference on
Palestine scheduled for 5 December 2004 at the School of Oriental and African
Studies in London is entitled by its organizers as "Resisting Israeli Apartheid:
Strategies and Principles".
I would like to warn against an unthinking use of this misleading analogy
between Israeli policy and that of the defunct apartheid regime in South Africa.
It is theoretically false and politically harmful.
To be sure, the two have many features in common. Both are perniciously
racist; both impose a degree of separation between ethnic groups. And this is no
accident: both are instances of the genus colonial settler state. Indeed, Israel
and apartheid South Africa were, until the latter's demise, the last two
surviving active instances of this genus.[1] Now Israel is the only remaining
one.
But the point is that they belong to two distinct species of the genus. All
colonial settlers' societies built themselves up on exploiting the resources of
the country that they colonized: primarily its land, which they wrested from the
indigenous people, who became dispossessed. The decisive difference between the
two species was what was to become of the dispossessed natives.
In one model of colonization, their labor power became one of the indigenous
resources - indeed, the main resource - to be exploited by the settlers. The
ethnic conflict between the two groups thus assumed the nature of a kind of
class struggle. This model is represented, in almost pure form, by apartheid
South Africa.
In the other model, the native population was to be eliminated; exterminated
or expelled rather than exploited. Israel is an active instance of this model.
If you wish to find an instructive parallel, look not at South Africa. Rather,
read Dee Brown's Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the
American West.
Apartheid was a device for keeping the exploited natives - the majority of
the population - as part of the same economy, and therefore essentially also of
the same society, as the settler exploiters; but without actually admitting it,
and without giving the former rights of citizenship. Officially, the natives
were citizens of fake states, the Bantustans. But the last thing the architects
of the apartheid state wanted was a real departure of the black Africans, whose
labor power was vital for its economy.
Zionism never intended to create a Palestinostan for the Palestinian Arabs.
From the very start, it planned to get rid of them, to create a purely Jewish
"Land of Israel". This premeditated policy - referred to in Zionist literature
as 'transfer' - was largely implemented in the 1948 war. The Palestinian Arab
minority whom - for lack of time or opportunity – the nascent Israeli state
failed to expel from its territory did not seem to represent a major
"demographic threat". To be sure, their lands were for the most part
expropriated and given over to Jewish settlements, they were severely
discriminated and for many years kept under military rule. But, crucially, they
were not denied rudimentary citizenship rights. They are Israeli citizens, who
can vote for the Knesset.
A new problem arose following the June 1967 war. Israel found itself
controlling the whole of Palestine as well as a part of Syria. But, from the
Zionists' viewpoint, this great territorial acquisition of their wet dreams came
with an encumbrance: a large Arab population, many of them refugees of the 1948
ethnic cleansing and their descendants. This population, which "remained 'stuck'
to their places," the Zionists realized, "may destroy the very foundation of our
state."[2] Israel managed to ethnically cleanse some
of the newly occupied territories, such as the whole of the Golan Heights,
the Latroun salient in the approaches to Jerusalem, and some refugee camps near
Jericho. But the bulk of the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip still
"remained stuck to their places."
Zionists of all major parties - Labor and Likud alike - ardently wished to
'transfer' as many Palestinians as possible. The only difference was about what
was considered possible. The more pragmatic or cautious among them thought that
the 'world' (which for Israel meant primarily US politicians and
opinion-manufacturers) would not allow a massive ethnic cleansing. On the other
hand, it was becoming clear, especially during the first Intifada, that Israel
could not afford to control the Palestinian population directly.
These more pragmatic Zionists looked for a Palestinian leadership to do the
job for them: to control and repress the Palestinians, thus guaranteeing the
security of Israel. This was the essence of the Oslo Accord, which Peres managed
to sell to Rabin and, no less important, to Yasser Arafat.[3]
The Oslo plan, had it materialized, would indeed have led to something like a
Palestinian Bantustan, resulting in a convergence of the Zionist settler state
towards the apartheid model. But this was not to be. The plan was vigorously
opposed by more optimistic or fundamentalist Zionists, such as Ehud Barak in the
Labor Party and most of the leaders of Likud. Just in time, Rabin was
assassinated. The Netanyahu government which followed stalled the implementation
of Israel's side of the Oslo bargain, thus subverting it. The next Israeli prime
minister, Labor's Ehud Barak, continued this policy at Camp David by a more
subtle means: dictating to Arafat new conditions, falsely packaged as a
'generous offer', that even he could not accept.
The next prime minister, Ariel 'Bulldozer' Sharon, true to his legendary
brutality and blood lust, has pursued yet another tactic: smashing the
Palestinian Authority's resources and at the same time deliberately provoking
Palestinian suicide bombings, so as to expose Arafat's inability to serve as
Israel's security guard, and thus prove his uselessness and irrelevance from a
Zionist viewpoint.
What Sharon & Co are planning is not really an apartheid regime. They are
not interested in keeping the Palestinians permanently in place, as a subjugated
population. They are planning to ethnically cleanse as many Palestinians as
possible. Of course, this requires what in Zionist parlance is referred to as
she'at kosher, an opportune moment. A general upheaval in the Middle East may
present a suitable opportunity. If necessary, it could actually be provoked.
Meantime, as a purely temporary measure, the Palestinian population is to be
atomized and separated - not only from the Israeli Jews but also within their
own community, village from village, neighborhood from neighborhood. And make no
mistake: this is not going to be like a Bantustan, more like a series of Indian
Reservations.
Conflating this with apartheid in fact misses the most essential point.
Incidentally, it can also backfire: defenders of Zionism can easily show that
the Palestinian citizens of Israel, while not enjoying equal rights, are
nevertheless considerably better off than Black Africans used to be under
apartheid.
But, much more importantly: talk of Israeli 'apartheid' serves to divert
attention from much greater dangers. For, as far as most Palestinians are
concerned, the Zionist policy is far worse than apartheid. Apartheid can be
reversed. Ethnic cleansing is immeasurably harder to reverse; at least not in
the short or medium term.
To be sure: there is one great difference between the Zionist colonization
project and that of the United States. When the US achieved its 'manifest
destiny' and reached from ocean to ocean, grinding to dust the indigenous people
- that was that: no more 'Red Indians' to hunt and uproot. In the case of
Zionist Israel, no matter how far it can expand - and surely it will need to
expand further in order to protect and defend its former expansion - it will
always be confronted and surrounded by Arabs. If the Arab world will one day
unite, it can defeat and reverse Zionist expansionism.
But this will require a far-reaching transformation of the Arab World, defeat
of its present ruling classes and unification of the Arab nation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. There are of course several other states that started off in this way; but
they have ceased to be active in a sense similar to that in which an extinct
volcano still exists as a mountain, but is no longer active as a volcano.
2. Joseph Weitz, 'A solution to the refugee problem: a State of Israel with a
small Arab minority', Davar, 29 September 1967. Davar was the Histadrut daily,
in effect organ of the Israeli Labor Party. Weitz was member of that party, an
apparatchik who had played a central role in planning the transfer before 1948
and implementing it during 1948/49.
3. I have dealt elsewhere with
the reasons for Arafat's acquiescence in accepting what amounted to little more
than the job of Israel's proxy Palestinian Police Chief.