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[JPN Commentary: High-profile violence is once again on the rise between Israel and the Palestinians. It's important to keep in mind that while Israeli air strikes and Palestinian Qassam rocket fire grab attention, the daily violence of occupation (confrontations at checkpoints, arrests, attempts at suicide bombings, closures, harassment of civilians by soldiers and settlers, and the omnipresent disruption of Palestinian life by the ever-growing wall) continues virtually unabated.

In this case, Islamic Jihad and Hamas has been firing missiles from Gaza into Egypt, and Israel has resumed its policy of targeted assassinations and is massing its forces on the Gaza border. Both sides, as usual, call their actions retaliation for actions of the other side. the rhetoric is really meaningless. Both sides are simply doing what they always do--look for reasons to engage in the violence they believe will further their goals.

What is more important is the predictable hand-wringing over this escalation in the wake of the Gaza withdrawal. This is the next act in the play. After making sure the world was aware of the "great trauma" of the Gaza withdrawal, Israel will now move on to show that even if they withdraw from Gaza, nothing will satisfy the Palestinians except the destruction of Israel. This point depends on Israel's ability to convince people that Gaza is no longer under occupation, and Ariel Sharon has spared no effort to convince the world of that point. Reality is, of course, quite different.

Two points need to be clear if we are to understand the continuing violence in the wake of Israel's pullback from the Gaza Strip. First, we must be clear that the occupation of Gaza has changed, it has not ended. Not only is Israel exercising the "right" it reserved to execute military operations in Gaza, but it maintains control over Gaza's airspace and coastline, as well as most of the border crossings. Under international pressure, Israel did relent and allow the Palestinians, in cooperation with Egypt, control of the Rafah crossing. Gazans have much more freedom of movement within the Strip, and can use the Rafah crossing. This last, however, is still under discussion and, as was seen this weekend when the Palestinians closed the border after Israeli insistence, is not totally free of Israeli involvement by any means.

Of greater importance for the future is the flaw in the basic premise under which the hand-wringers are working. That is the notion that some reduction in the breadth and scope of the Israeli occupation will lead to a proportional reduction in Palestinian militant activity. The Palestinians of Gaza do not consider themselves as somehow separate from the Palestinians of the West Bank, nor vice versa. Particularly after the experience of the Oslo years (1993-2000) which saw an unprecedented explosion in the growth of settlements (the settler population increased in these years from 116,400 to 242,313, according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace), only visible progress toward an end of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and a clear signal from Israel that issues like Jerusalem and refugees will be settled by sincere negotiations can be expected to bring about such a result.

Another point that needs to be made is that the explosion in Gaza that caused the closure of the Rafah crossing and which Hamas used as their excuse to launch rocket attacks into Israel was apparently, according to Palestinian sources, caused by the mishandling of explosives. That these explosives were even present at a rally where they put many civilians at risk and where they, in the event, killed some 15 people, including several children. It is events like these, which are all too common with military and para-military groups, that demonstrate the bankruptcy of violence. -- MP]

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/628624.html

The Israel Defense Forces carried out three air strikes in the northern Gaza Strip yesterday, killing four members of Hamas and injuring nine other people.

The attacks signaled Israel's return to a policy of assassinating Palestinian militants in Gaza and followed a barrage of Qassam rockets Hamas fired at Israel in the first attack since the disengagement.

At a meeting with Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, heads of the defense establishment also decided to amass forces along the Gaza border in preparation for a possible ground operation.

The IDF attacks followed a barrage of Qassam rockets into Israel, which Hamas said were in response to a blast at a Hamas rally in Jabalya refugee camp on Friday, in which 16 were killed, including eight civilians and four children, and 80 injured.

Hamas initially blamed Israel for the explosion, but the Palestinian Authority and some Hamas officials later said the blast was caused by mishandling of explosives in a Hamas vehicle at the rally.

At about 5 A.M. yesterday, the air force bombed munition warehouses in the Jabalya, Tel al-Hawa and Zeitun areas, lightly injuring three Palestinians. At about 11 A.M., the air force attacked Qassam launchers in the Beit Hanun area, but apparently missed.

Close to 4 P.M. yesterday, IAF jets launched an air strike at two vehicles in Gaza's Zeitun quarter, killing four men. The IDF said one of the vehicles had been carrying weapons and the other was carrying Hamas members.

An eye witness said a group of children had been playing nearby at the time of the strike on the vehicles and it appeared that some of them were wounded.

Palestinian sources said those killed were Hamas activists who were delivering rockets to the launching teams.

Hamas spokesman Mushir al-Masri promised retaliation for the air strikes.

Intelligence sources told Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz yesterday the blast at Jabalya refugee camp was likely the result of a "work accident," the explosions may have been set off when two pickup trucks carrying masked militants and laden with weapons blew up.

The PA said the explosion was caused by Hamas "mishandling explosives." However, Hamas held news conferences blaming Israel and said the rockets were dummies that did not contain explosives.

Hamas reported that three of its militants were killed in the explosions, including As'ad Rian, the brother of Nizar Rian, a senior member of the group's political wing.

The group said "thousands of eye witnesses saw" that an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle fired missiles into the rally and that Israeli helicopters were seen over Gaza during the march.

Israeli sources said the helicopters were there following Islamic Jihad's Qassam firing a few hours earlier, and did not shoot any missiles at the rally participants.

The IDF denied the army's involvement in firing into the rally.

Three Qassam rockets fired at Sderot on Friday, landing in an open field and causing no injuries. Twenty-one of the Qassam rockets landed in the western Negev town of Sderot, wounding six Israelis, one moderately and the others lightly, the army said. Six others were treated for shock.

Islamic Jihad took responsibility for Friday's attack, claiming it was in retaliation for the killing of three Islamic Jihad leaders in Tul Karm earlier in the day.

Early Friday, police officers from an elite anti-terror unit entered a village near Tul Karm in search of Jihad activists suspected of being involved in the suicide bombings at Tel Aviv's Stage club and Hasharon shopping center. The wanted men fled into an open area outside the village, where the police shot two of them them dead. The third was found and killed nearby.

[JPN Commentary: In our tribute to our dear and departed editor, Amichai Kronfeld last week, the following personal reminiscence was accidentally omitted. If you missed the full piece, you can see it by clicking here. --MP]

I’d like to share with you something we have from Amichai, whom we loved very much, which certainly is relevant to his desire for peace.

About 20 years ago, my daughter who was then in the 8th grade in Albany Middle School, had to do a history project about any subject she chose. Being Israeli, she decided to write about the “The Israeli/Arab Six-Day War – The Official Story vs. Personal Experiences,” and to interview some of our friends about their experiences in the war. Amichai's responded to her request to talk about the war wholeheartedly, since he was always open to kids, talking with them directly, as equals. He believed deeply in the value of educating young people, and helping them choose between right and wrong. The interview actually proved to be not only interesting but also moving. Amichai talked in detail about things we had not known before; it appeared that talking to a 13-year old actually made it easier for him to be open about painful memories. What he said shows that even at 19, he was very conscientious, and refused to take immoral orders. It's no wonder that, years later, when he bought a car in America, he immediately put a sticker on the rear window which said “Question Authority.”

Let me quote one passage from Tali’s project word-for-word:

Amichai: “I was in the Sinai, in the infantry, and after the month of preparations for the war, we crossed the border [on the 5th of June]. The night after the first night of the war, we attacked an Egyptian base. The battle lasted all night, and that night changed my life; the experience of having to kill was something I’ll never forget. . . . Then after the war was over, we were supposed to look for Egyptian soldiers, concentrate them, and then execute them. The orders from Arik Sharon (the infantry commander at the time) was not to take any prisoners, but rather kill them. I refused to do it, although everyone else did it, because these were the orders. Some even enjoyed killing the enemy against whom they fought in the preceding days. The next day I was sent to bury corpses, because I was an embarrassment. Actually I didn’t bury them myself; I was an overseer, watching Egyptian men bury their own corpses.”

We have other memories of dear Amichai, his warmth and sincerity, how he was entertaining and amusing, and simply fun to be with, but the story above demonstrates something we respect so much in him: his humanism and relentless pursuit of justice and peace.

Mourning Amichai, and remembering him with love,
Zehavit, Shimon, Tali and Dan.

[JPN Commentary: Veteran Israeli peace activist, Uri Avnery, offers us the following analysis of what he describes as a shift in the Israeli "consensus". By consensus, Avnery means the view of the major portion of the Israeli populace, the political center. Avnery believes that after the last great shift, which was the recognition of a Palestinian people, was the recognition, embodied in the Gaza withdrawal, that Israel would never be able to permanently control all of what had been Palestine under the British Mandate.

The important point for Avnery is not where the "consensus" stands today, but rather that it can be moved. In his view, this means that it is possible to get to the goal he wants--an agreement based on the 1967 borders and that mutually agreeable exchanges of land can be accomplished based on that principle. While one might not share Avnery's complete dismissal of the refugee issue, and his downplaying of the thorny problem of Jerusalem seems to be a big missing piece in his vision, Avnery makes an important point. Positions that seem rock-solid and immutable may not be, given enough effort. Major, established settlements can be removed, as Gaza proved. Of course, this will be more difficult on the West Bank, but it can obviously be done. That is how the Gaza withdrawal can hold the potential for real, substantive gains, rather than the smokescreen for consolidating Israeli control of the West Bank (or, as Dov Weisglass put it, the means to "put formaldehyde in the peace process") that it seems to be right now. -- MP]

In "The Second Coming", the Irish poet W. B. Yeats described chaos thus: "Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer; / Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; / Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, / The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere / The ceremony of innocence is drowned; / The best lack all conviction, while the worst / are full of passionate intensity."

The defining phrase, as I read it, is "the center cannot hold". It is a military metaphor: On the classical battlefield, the main force was located in the middle, with the flanks secured by lighter forces. The enemy's aim was to break the center, often by turning the flanks. But even if the flanks collapsed, as long as the center held, the battle was not lost.

That also holds for a political struggle. Everything hinges on the public in the center. If one wants to make a revolution, the stability of the center must be undermined.

That was the aim of the settlers, when they started their nationwide campaign against the Gaza withdrawal. It ended in utter collapse, a defeat of historic proportions. In spite of the dramatic spectacle of the uprooting of the settlements, where everything was planned down to the minutest detail by the rabbis and the army, there was no real public crisis, no national trauma. In Yeats' language: "The center held".

To understand Israel, one has to comprehend the nature of this center. What convictions hold it together?

A national consensus is not immutable. It changes all the time, but very, very slowly, in an unseen, unfelt process. Only rarely, as a result of a dramatic occurrence, does it change rapidly. That happened, for example, in the 1967 war. A day before the war started, only a few of us dared to dream that the Arab world would recognize the State of Israel in its then borders. A day after, the dream had become a nightmare; anyone speaking about the "1967 borders" was considered a traitor. But that was an exceptional event. Ordinarily, the consensus moves as silently as a polar glacier.

The consensus of the Israeli-Jewish majority in the fall of 2005 rests on three pillars:

First: A Jewish State. That is the common denominator of almost all Jews in Israel. If one does not grasp the centrality of this conviction, one understands nothing about Israel.

"A Jewish state" is a state inhabited by Jews. True, it is unavoidable that some citizens will be non-Jews, but their number must be held to the absolute minimum, so that they are unable to have any influence on the character and policy of the state. This aim is embedded in the very substance of the Zionist movement, which started with a book called "Der Judenstaat". It derives its force from the hundreds of years of persecution, when Jews, helpless and defenseless, were at the mercy of all.

The Jewish Israelis want to live in a state of their own, of themselves alone, where they are masters of their fate. This desire is anchored so deeply in the hearts of most of them, that there is no chance for any contrary plan - be it "Greater Israel" or a "bi-National State". Consequently, there is no chance at all that the majority would agree to a massive return of Arab refugees to the territory of Israel.

Second: Enlarging the State. The Zionist movement wanted to take hold of the country then called Palestine, all or most of it, and to settle in it.

This, too, is a profound desire, imbedded in the very character of the movement, a part of its "genes". But this second desire is subordinate to the first one. If there were a possibility of conquering the entire country and "getting rid" of all the Palestinian population, as proposed by the extreme right, it would certainly appeal to many. But the majority knows now that this is not a practical proposition. The conclusion is that the parts of the country with a dense Palestinian population must be "given up".

Third: Recognition of the Palestinian People. That is a great change. It contradicts the classic position of the Zionist movement which was adopted by all Israeli governments until the Oslo agreement, expressed by the famous dictum of Golda Meir: "There is no such thing as a Palestinian people". When, in the 1950s, we demanded the recognition the Palestinian people, we were considered traitors or fools, or both. But two intifadas, the international situation and our consistent public opinion campaign have done their work.

The combination of these three principles forms the picture of the present consensus: Israel must annex certain areas of the West Bank and relinquish the rest.

This consensus encompasses the major part of the Israeli political landscape, from Ariel Sharon, Binyamin Netanyahu and Uzi Landau to Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin.

The disagreements concern only the extent of the annexation. It reminds one - mutatis mutandis - of the story attributed to Bernard Shaw, who offered to pay a duchess a million pounds to sleep with him. When she consented, he reduced his offer to a hundred pounds, saying: "now that we have agreed on the principle, all that remains is to settle the price."

Sharon has spoken in the past about annexing 58% of the West Bank, comprising the settlement blocs, Greater Jerusalem (with the territory connecting it to Ma'aleh Adumim) the Jordan valley and the areas between them. He was prepared to leave to the Palestinians their towns and densely populated rural areas. Recently, he has hinted that he might give up the Jordan Valley. He asserts that President Bush has agreed to his plan, but while Sharon talks about "settlement blocs", Bush spoke about "population centers". There is a big difference between the two: a "settlement bloc" includes not only the large settlement itself, but also the smaller ones around it and the area between them. A "population center" means only the large settlement itself, which would leave a much smaller area to be annexed.

At Camp David, Ehud Barak proposed the annexation of 21% of the West Bank, in a way that would have cut the Palestinian territory into pieces. He also wanted to "rent" 13% more in the Jordan valley. Later, at the Taba conference, the annexation came down to 8%, but the tentative accord was repudiated by the Israeli government.

Yossi Beilin was the father of the "settlement blocs" concept, when, long ago, he reached an unofficial agreement with Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas). The more recent Geneva Initiative, proposed by Beilin and Yasser Abed-Rabbo, speaks only about an annexation of 2.3%, as part of a 1:1 territorial swap.

The Separation Fence now being built by the Sharon government is designed to further the ongoing enlargement of the settlements. It annexes 8% of the West Bank along its western border with Israel. The annexation of the Jordan valley in the East is, for the time being, left open.

These are the boundaries of the present consensus. The debate in Israel, in the near future, will center on the extent and the means of the annexation.

One version has it that there should be no negotiations with the Palestinians, since they will not agree to large annexations. Therefore, Israel should continue with "unilateral" steps, as practiced in the Gaza withdrawal - and annex territories without agreement. The slogan: "Israel itself will fix its borders". The contrary version says that agreement can be achieved on a limited annexation within the framework of an exchange of territories.

The extreme right rejects this consensus. It does not want any compromise. It waves the divine title deed, personally signed by the Almighty, and wants to annex the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip. Without saying so explicitly, this concept means the total expulsion of the Palestinians from Palestine.

The radical peace movement opposes the consensus from the opposite direction. It believes that the future of Israel will only be secure in a lasting peace, based on an agreement between equals and the reconciliation of the two peoples. This camp believes that the agreement must be based on the pre-1967 Green Line border, and that only in the course of negotiations will it become clear if an understanding on fair territorial exchanges can be reached.

However, the main thing is that the consensus is moving. Greater Israel is dead. The partition of the country is now accepted by the overwhelming majority. This means that one can influence public opinion. The "disengagement" affair has shown that settlements can be removed. The public accepted the precedent without flinching. Now the task is to convince the public that real negotiations should be started.

There is someone to talk with, and there is something to talk about.

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